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COMMENTS 
A LAW OF PASSION, NOT OF PRINCIPLE, 
NOR EVEN PURPOSE: A CALL TO REPEAL 
OR REVISE THE ADAM WALSH ACT 
AMENDMENTS TO THE BAIL REFORM 




The Bail Reform Act of 1984 lays out the rules and procedures for 
federal pretrial release and detention.  In 2006, as part of the Adam Walsh 
Child Protection and Safety Act, Congress amended the Bail Reform Act.  
Before the Adam Walsh Act Amendments (AWA Amendments) were passed, 
a judicial officer decided whether to release a defendant, whether to impose 
pretrial release conditions, and what pretrial release conditions to impose 
on a case-by-case basis.  The AWA Amendments, in contrast, impose 
mandatory pretrial release conditions, including electronic monitoring and 
curfew, on all defendants charged with certain enumerated sexual offenses 
against children.  Many district courts have found mandatory imposition of 
pretrial release conditions unconstitutional and refuse to apply the AWA 
Amendments when setting bail. 
This Comment argues that Congress must repeal or revise the AWA 
Amendments to the Bail Reform Act of 1984 because they are 
unconstitutional under the Excessive Bail and Due Process Clauses, are 
completely inconsistent with the Bail Reform Act’s core principle of 
individualized judicial determination of bail, and come at a great cost to the 
defendant at little or no additional benefit to the public.  This Comment 
proposes that the AWA Amendments be revised so that certain pretrial 
release conditions are imposed based on a rebuttable presumption instead 
 
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Northwestern University School of Law, May 2011; B.A., 
M.A., Emory University, 2006. 
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of mandatorily, as in, a judge will impose them unless a defendant can 
rebut their imposition with evidence that the conditions are unnecessary to 
ensure the public’s safety.  This proposed revision not only fulfills 
Congress’s original purpose of increased safety in enacting the AWA 
Amendments, but it is also constitutional and consistent with the rest of the 
Bail Reform Act. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On July 27, 2006, George W. Bush signed the Adam Walsh Child 
Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (AWA).1  Standing next to him was John 
Walsh, the father of the AWA’s namesake.2  Exactly twenty-five years 
earlier, Adam Walsh, who was six years old at the time, was abducted and 
murdered.3  However, John Walsh did not receive the privilege of standing 
next to President Bush as he signed the AWA because his son was a victim 
of the type of crime against children the AWA was intended to protect.  
Instead, John Walsh was likely given the honor because he was also the 
host of America’s Most Wanted, a long-running show on the FOX network 
devoted exclusively to apprehending extremely dangerous fugitives.  In 
addition to helping catch the criminals that America’s Most Wanted features 
on the show, Mr. Walsh and his program have been lauded for their role in 
helping bring the threat of crime, especially sexual offenses against 
children, to the forefront of the public’s mind.4
John Walsh and his television program were instrumental to the 




1 Remarks on Signing the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 43 
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1395 (July 27, 2006) (enacting Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 
587 (2006) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–91 (2006)).  
  The success of America’s Most Wanted and other 
shows inspired by its success, including NBC’s To Catch a Predator and 
CNN’s Nancy Grace, have helped create a public panic about the threat of 
2 Id.  
3 Yolanne Almanzar, 27 Years Later, Case is Closed in Slaying of Abducted Child, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2008, at A18. 
4 See Barbara Whitaker, ‘America’s Most Wanted’ Enlists Public, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 
2003, at A20 (describing the positive impact America’s Most Wanted has had on capturing 
violent criminals and recovering abducted children). 
5 See Corey Rayburn Yung, The Emerging Criminal War on Sex Offenders, 45 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 457–58 (2010) (“The mass media has fanned the flames by using . . . 
war rhetoric in discussing the crackdown on sex offenders.  Early in the second Bush 
administration, CNN featured a rape counselor who called for an aggressive war on sex 
offenders.  In 2006, John Walsh, Adam Walsh’s father said that his show, America’s Most 
Wanted, was starting a ‘war’ on sex offenders, Fox News personalities Sean Hannity, Alan 
Colmes, and Bill O’Reilly offered their support with such a mission.”).  
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child sex offenders.6  This panic has created a demand for Congress to enact 
laws that in many other contexts would be considered draconian.7  Philip 
Jenkins explains how, during a panic, “concern over sexual abuse provides 
a basis for extravagant claims-making by professionals, the media, and 
assorted interest groups, who argue that the problem is quantitatively and 
qualitatively far more severe than anyone could reasonably suppose.”8  Fear 
mongering, in turn, produces excessive and ill-considered legislative 
responses, with lawmakers adopting new policies that “may cause harm in 
areas having nothing to do with the original problem and that divert 
resources away from measures which might genuinely assist in protecting 
children.”9
Much of the AWA—including the AWA Amendments to the Bail 
Reform Act of 1984 (BRA)—is exactly the excessive and ill-considered 
legislative response that Mr. Jenkins warns is characteristic of Congress 
making laws in response to a panic.  In enacting the AWA, the federal 
government for the first time sought a prominent role in sex offender 
policy, substantially expanding prior federal efforts to regulate and punish 
sex offenses.
 
10  The AWA was formed from a conglomeration of bills that 
were before Congress at the time and includes many different laws.  
Scholars and appellate courts have vociferously debated the constitutional 
and practical merits of many of the AWA’s laws.  Such laws include the 
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), which requires 
that a sex offender register in any jurisdiction where he or she resides, 
works, or is a student,11
 
6 Id. 
 and the Jimmy Ryce Civil Commitment Program, 
which authorizes the federal government to civilly commit, in a federal 
7 See 152 CONG. REC. S8012 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“The 
bottom line here is that sex offenders have run rampant in this country and now Congress 
and the people are ready to respond with legislation that will curtail the ability of sex 
offenders to operate freely.  It is our hope that programs like NBC Dateline’s ‘To Catch a 
Predator’ series will no longer have enough material to fill an hour or even a minute.  Now, 
it seems, they can go to any city in this country and catch dozens of predators willing to go 
on-line to hunt children.”). 
8 PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD MOLESTER IN 
MODERN AMERICA 7 (1998). 
9 Id. 
10 Yung, supra note 5, at 451.  The first significant federal sex offender restriction 
legislation was The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent 
Offender Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. XVII, subtit. A, 108 Stat. 1796, 2038–
42 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006)) (requiring states to implement a sex 
offender and crimes against children registry). 
11 42 U.S.C. § 16919 (2006). 
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facility, any “sexually dangerous” person “in the custody” of the Bureau of 
Prisons—even after that person has completed his prison sentence.12
Commentary on the AWA Amendments to the BRA, however, is 
conspicuously missing from the literature on the AWA laws, even though 
the Amendments also raise significant constitutional and practical concerns.  
Before the AWA Amendments were passed, a judicial officer exclusively 
decided, on a case-by-case basis, whether to release a defendant, whether to 
impose pretrial release conditions, and what pretrial release conditions to 
impose.
 
13  The AWA Amendments, in contrast, impose mandatory pretrial 
release conditions, including electronic monitoring and curfew, on all 
defendants charged with certain enumerated sexual offenses against 
children.14
This Comment argues that Congress must repeal the AWA 
Amendments or, in the alternative, revise them so defendants can avoid the 
imposition of these now mandatory release conditions with rebuttal 
evidence that the conditions are not necessary to ensure the public’s safety.  
First, the AWA Amendments must be repealed or revised because they are 
unconstitutional on their face as a violation of the Excessive Bail and Due 
Process Clauses.  Second, the Amendments’ imposition of mandatory 
pretrial release conditions is inconsistent with one of the core principles of 
federal pretrial release under the BRA—judicially determined 
individualized bail.  Lastly, the Amendments do considerably more harm 
than good because costly pretrial release conditions are imposed 
automatically even when they are unnecessary to ensure the public’s safety. 
 
This Comment proceeds in six parts.  Part II provides an overview of 
federal pretrial release and detention under the BRA, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States v. Salerno upholding the BRA’s constitutionality, 
and the AWA Amendments to the BRA.  Part III describes how the federal 
judiciary has reacted to the AWA Amendments.  Part IV argues that the 
AWA Amendments must be repealed or revised.  Part V proposes a revision 
to the Amendments that fulfills Congress’s original purpose in enacting the 
Amendment while fixing the problems described in Part IV.  Part VI 
concludes. 
 
12 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a), (d) (2006).  In United States v. Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949 (2010), 
the Supreme Court held that § 4248, the federal statute allowing a district court to order the 
civil commitment of a sexually dangerous federal prisoner beyond the date the prisoner 
would otherwise be released, was constitutional under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Id. 
at 1967–68.  
13 See infra Part II.A. 
14 See infra Part II.C. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. THE BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984 
The history of federal bail legislation begins with the Judiciary Act of 
1789, in which Congress mandated that bail be granted to all defendants 
accused of noncapital crimes.15  Yet, the use of bail was so inconsistent in 
the mid-twentieth century that Congress passed the Bail Reform Act of 
1966.16  One commentator notes that “[b]efore 1966, federal courts relied 
on bail ‘almost exclusively’ to ensure a defendant’s presence at trial.”17  
The Bail Reform Act of 1966 required the federal courts to release any 
defendant charged with a non-capital crime on his or her recognizance or an 
unsecured appearance bond unless the court determined that the defendant 
would fail to appear for trial under such minimal supervision.18
The Bail Reform Act of 1984, part of the Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act of 1984, when initially passed “effected a dramatic overhaul of 
the nature and function of federal pretrial release proceedings.”
 
19  Section 
3142 changed prior law dramatically by including “the nature and 
seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be 
posed by the person’s release” as a factor a judicial officer must consider in 
determining conditions of pretrial release.20  The change in the law reflected 
“the deep public concern . . . about the growing problem of crimes 
committed by persons on release.”21
The BRA requires a hearing to determine whether any condition or 
combination of conditions of release would protect the safety of the 
community and reasonably ensure the defendant’s appearance.
   
22
 
15 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3141 (2006)). 
  The BRA 
also places the burden on the government to establish the defendant’s 
16 Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 4, 80 Stat. 217 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 3146–3152 (Supp V. 1966)).. 
17 Joseph L. Lester, Presumed Innocent, Feared Dangerous: The Eighth Amendment’s 
Right to Bail, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 17 (2005). 
18 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL PRETRIAL RELEASE AND 
DETENTION, 1966, at 5 (1999) (citing H.R. REP NO. 1541-89 (1966)). 
19 John B. Howard, Jr., Note, The Trial of Pretrial Dangerousness: Preventative 
Detention After United States v. Salerno, 75 VA. L. REV. 639, 648 (1989); see also United 
States v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400, 403–06 (2d Cir. 1984) (describing how § 3142 of the 
BRA has dramatically changed prior law). 
20 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (2006). 
21 S. REP. NO. 225-98, at 6–7 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3188–89. 
22 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). 
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dangerousness by “clear and convincing evidence.”23  In a bail hearing, the 
BRA aides the government by including a rebuttable presumption in favor 
of detention based on risk of flight and protecting public safety in two 
categories of cases: (1) where the defendant has, while on pretrial release in 
the preceding five years, committed and been convicted of one of the 
offenses for which a detention hearing may be held; or (2) where the 
defendant is charged with a major drug offense or certain firearm 
offenses.24  Thus, while Congress left “[t]he pretrial fate of other defendants 
subject to a hearing who pose a specific and unrestrainable danger before 
trial . . . entirely to courts to be determined on a case-by-case basis,” the 
establishment of presumptions of dangerousness and flight in the BRA gave 
Congress some control over the pretrial process that otherwise would be left 
to the courts.25
Aside from the BRA’s “presumption of dangerousness” provision, 
“Congress hesitated to go very far in specifying what characteristics should 
receive the most weight in the determination of dangerousness.”
 
26  Instead, 
Congress put in place extensive procedural mechanisms in an effort to 
increase the accuracy of judicial determinations of future dangerousness.27  
At a bail hearing, the defendant has the right to counsel, the right to testify, 
the opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses in support of or 
against future dangerousness, and the right to present information by 
proffer.28  The judicial officer must take into account certain statutory 
factors and find by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of 
release are adequate to ensure public safety, giving written findings of fact 





24 § 3142(e). 
25 Howard, supra note 19, at 652. 
26 Id. 
27 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987) (“Under the Bail Reform Act, 
the procedures by which a judicial officer evaluates the likelihood of future dangerousness 
are specifically designed to further the accuracy of that determination.”). 
28 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). 
29 Id. §§ 3142(f), (i), § 3145.  The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure require that a 
written statement of reasons accompany a release order.  FED. R. APP. P. 9(a),  In several 
circuits, a failure to comply with this requirement in contested cases results in a remand.  
DAVID N. ADAIR, THE BAIL REFORM ACT 4 (3d ed. 2006) (citing to United States v. Cantu, 
935 F.2d 950, 951 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Tortora, 922 F.2d 880, 883 (1st Cir. 
1990); United States v. Hooks, 811 F.2d 391, 391 (7th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); United States 
v. Wheeler, 795 F.2d 839, 841 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 
1480 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Coleman, 777 F.2d 888, 892 (3d Cir. 1985)).  
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If the judicial officer finds that detention is not necessary to ensure 
public safety, the judicial officer may release the defendant on personal 
recognizance or unsecured appearance bond.30  If such release “will not 
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or will endanger 
the safety of any other person or the community,”31 the judicial officer must 
impose “the least restrictive . . . condition, or combination of conditions, 
that . . . will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and 
the safety of any other person and the community.”32
B. UNITED STATES V. SALERNO AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 
BRA’S PRETRIAL DETENTION PROVISION 
 
In United States v. Salerno, the Supreme Court held that the Bail 
Reform Act’s pretrial detention provision was constitutional.33  Although 
the AWA Amendments to the BRA concern situations where a defendant is 
released on bail pursuant to § 3142(b), Salerno’s rejection of due process 
and excessive bail challenges to the BRA’s detention provision informs the 
constitutional analysis of the AWA Amendments’ mandatory pretrial 
conditions.34
First, the Court rejected the argument that the BRA’s authorization of 
pretrial detention constitutes impermissible punishment before trial, and 
thus violates substantive due process.
 
35  The Court explained, “the mere fact 
that a person is detained does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the 
government has imposed punishment.”36  The Court further explained that 
“[u]nless Congress expressly intended to impose punitive restrictions, the 
punitive/regulatory distinction turns on ‘whether an alternative purpose to 
which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and 
whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned 
[to it].’”37
The Court concluded that the BRA’s legislative history “clearly 
indicates that Congress did not formulate the pretrial detention provisions 
 
 
30 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a). 
31 § 3142(c). 
32 § 3142(c)(1)(B). 
33 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
34 This Comment argues that the AWA Amendments violate procedural due process.  See 
infra Part IV.A.2.  Although the defendants in Salerno challenged the BRA on a substantive 
due process basis, the Supreme Court held that the BRA is facially valid under the Due 
Process Clause in part because of the “procedural protections it offers.”  Salerno, 481 U.S. at 
752. 
35 Id. at 746–47. 
36 Id. (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979)). 
37 Id. at 747 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963)). 
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as punishment for dangerous individuals,” but “instead perceived pretrial 
detention as a potential solution to a pressing societal problem”—the 
legitimate regulatory goal of “preventing danger to the community.”38  The 
Court also found that pretrial detention was not excessive in relation to the 
regulatory goal Congress sought to achieve because the BRA narrowly 
focuses on a particularly acute problem—crime by arrestees—in which the 
government’s interests are overwhelming.39  Further, the BRA satisfied due 
process scrutiny because the detention provision “operates only on 
individuals who have been arrested for particular extremely serious 
offenses,” and carefully delineates the circumstances under which detention 
will be permitted.40
The Court rejected the defendant’s contention that the BRA was a 
“scattershot attempt to incapacitate those who are merely suspected of these 
serious crimes”
 
41 because it guarantees defendants extensive procedural 
safeguards, including a full-blown adversary hearing where the government 
is required to convince a neutral decision-maker by clear and convincing 
evidence that no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of 
the community or any person.42  In sum, the Court upheld the BRA because 
of its legitimate and compelling regulatory purpose and the procedural 
protections it offers.43
C. THE ADAM WALSH ACT AMENDMENTS TO THE BAIL REFORM ACT 
 
In 2006, as part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 
2006, Congress enacted “improvements to the bail reform act to address sex 
crimes and other matters.”44  The AWA Amendments mandate that in any 




 or a failure to register offense under § 2250, “any 
39 Id. at 750.  The Court in Salerno explained that these were the individuals “Congress 
specifically found . . . are far more likely to be responsible for dangerous acts in the 
community after arrest.”  Id.  
40 Id. at 749. 
41 Id. at 750. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 749–50. 
44 Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 203, 120 Stat. 587, 613 (2006). 
45 The sections mandating mandatory pretrial release conditions pursuant to the 
Amendment include: §§ 1201 [kidnapping], 1591 [sex trafficking of children or by force, 
fraud, or coercion], 2241 [aggravated sexual abuse], 2242 [sexual abuse], 2244(a)(1) 
[abusive sexual contact], 2245 [offenses resulting in death], 2251 [sexual exploitation of 
children], 2251A [selling or buying of children for sexual exploitation], 2252(a)(1), 
2252(a)(2), 2252(a)(3), 2252A(a)(1) [transmission of child pornography], 2252A(a)(2) 
[receipt of child pornography], 2252A(a)(3) [reproduction of child pornography], 
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release order shall contain, at a minimum, a condition of electronic 
monitoring and each of the conditions specified . . . .”46
(iv) abide by specified restrictions on personal associations, place of abode, or travel; 
  Therefore, under 
the Amendments an individual charged with one of the above crimes—
which are all sex-offender oriented—must: 
(v) avoid all contact with an alleged victim of the crime and with a potential witness 
who may testify concerning the offense; 
(vi) report on a regular basis to a designated law enforcement agency, pretrial services 
agency, or other agency; 
(vii) comply with a specified curfew; [and] 
(viii) refrain from possessing a firearm, destructive device, or other dangerous 
weapon.47
Unlike the evidence and legislative findings Congress produced in 
support of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, the legislative record of the AWA 
Amendments suggests that Congress neither engaged in substantive debate 
nor developed supporting congressional reports in enacting the law.  The 
AWA Amendments were added to the bill’s language only seven days prior 
to the bill’s final passage as part of a Senate floor amendment
 
48 without any 
debate.49  In addition to being absent from the legislative history, the AWA 
Amendments are also nowhere to be found in President George W. Bush’s 
signing statement,50 further suggesting that it was not perceived as a major 
part of the law when it was enacted.51
 
2252A(a)(4) [sale or possession of child pornography], 2260 [production of child 
pornography for importation into the United States], 2421 [transportation of individual for 
illegal sexual activity], 2422 [coercion or enticement of individual to travel interstate or 
foreign territory to engage in prostitution], 2423 [transportation of minor to engage in 
criminal sexual activity], and 2425 [communication of minor under sixteen for purposes of 
sexual activity]. 
  As discussed in Part IV, the AWA 
46 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (2006). 
47 Id. 
48 See 152 CONG. REC. S8012 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (reproducing debate following 
passage of Sen. Hatch’s amendment in the nature of a substitute that included the mandatory 
conditions). 
49 In contrast to the AWA Amendments, the other major legislative provisions of the 
Adam Walsh Act were passed after congressional debate.  See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 109-218, 
at 23–24 (2005) (discussing the need for an enhanced sex offender registry program).   
50 Remarks on Signing the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 43 
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1395–96 (July 27, 2006). 
51 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. PHILIP FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION 
AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 315 (2d ed. 2006) (describing how presidential signing 
statements issued when bills are signed into law have been increasingly designed to provide 
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Amendments’ lack of legislative history severely undermines the argument 
that there is a compelling interest in carving out a special exception to the 
BRA’s core principle of individualized judicially determined bail and 
imposing mandatory pretrial release conditions for individuals charged with 
sexual offenses. 
Soon after the AWA Amendments were enacted, federal prosecutors 
used them to try to impose stricter pretrial release conditions than the 
judicial officer had determined was necessary after an individualized bail 
hearing had been held pursuant to § 3142(f).  For example, in United States 
v. Arzberger,52 the day after the judge issued the defendant’s pretrial release 
order, the Government notified the court that certain additional conditions 
were required under the AWA Amendments and asked the judge to modify 
the terms of the defendant’s release accordingly.53
Though the Government responded favorably to the AWA 
Amendments and used them to try to impose harsher pretrial conditions, the 
magistrates and district court judges, who were ultimately in charge of 
setting pretrial release conditions, were generally less receptive.  As Part III 
describes, the district courts have, with few exceptions, refused to modify 
their pretrial release order pursuant to AWA Amendments on the grounds 
that they are unconstitutional. 
 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT SPLIT ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 
ADAM WALSH ACT AMENDMENTS 
The courts are split on whether the AWA Amendments to the BRA are 
unconstitutional.  There is only one published appellate court opinion on 
this issue;54 the AWA Amendments’ constitutionality has almost 
exclusively been addressed by magistrate and district court judges.55
 
guidance to administrative actors who will implement the laws and to influence the judicial 
interpretation of the legislation). 
  The 
courts that have decided the AWA Amendments’ constitutionality have 
done so in three different ways: (1) finding them facially unconstitutional, 
(2) finding them unconstitutional as applied to the defendant, and (3) 
finding them facially constitutional.  The following is a brief review of 
these three approaches. 
52 592 F. Supp. 2d 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
53 Id. 
54 See United States v. Stephens, 594 F.3d 1033 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that the AWA 
Amendments are facially constitutional).  There is also one unpublished Ninth Circuit 
decision, United States v. Kennedy, 327 F. App’x 706, 707 (9th Cir. 2009).  See infra notes 
88–90 and accompanying text for a discussion of Kennedy. 
55 Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(2) (2006), magistrates have original jurisdiction over all 
matters pertaining to pretrial release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2006). 
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A. FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
Many district courts faced with applying the AWA Amendments to 
establish or modify pretrial release conditions for defendants charged with 
sexual offenses against children have held that the Amendments are facially 
unconstitutional.56  This is especially powerful because a judicial finding 
that a statute is facially unconstitutional renders it inoperative.57  In United 
States v. Crowell,58 a judge in the Western District of New York was one of 
the first to hold that the AWA Amendments were facially 
unconstitutional.59  Crowell is also important because many district courts 
that subsequently decided whether the AWA Amendments were facially 
constitutional referenced the decision, adopting or rejecting its reasoning.60
The court in Crowell evaluated challenges to the Amendments’ 
constitutionality based on the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Bail Clause, 
the Due Process Clause, and separation of powers.
 
61  First, the court cited to 
Salerno for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment requires that pretrial 
release conditions or detention “not be ‘excessive’ in light of the perceived 
evil to be avoided.”62
 
56 See United States v. Stephens, 699 F. Supp. 960 (N.D. Iowa 2009) (holding that the 
Amendments are facially unconstitutional under Due Process Clause), rev’d, 594 F.3d 1033 
(8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Smedley, 611 F. Supp. 2d 971 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (same); 
United States v. Rueb, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (D. Neb. 2009) (same); United States v. Merritt, 
612 F. Supp. 2d 1074 (D. Neb. 2009) (same); United States v. Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d 591 
(W.D. Tex. 2008) (same); United States v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(same); United States v. Vujnovich, No. 07-20126-01-CM-DJW, 2007 WL 4125901 (D. 
Kan. Nov. 20, 2007) (holding that the Amendments are facially unconstitutional under the 
Excessive Bail Clause, Due Process Clause, and separation of powers); United States v. 
Crowell, No. 06-1095, 2006 WL 3541736 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2006) (same). 
  The court held that although the additional conditions 
sought to be imposed by the AWA Amendments were not per se violative 
of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive bail, the 
imposition of such conditions regardless of a defendant’s personal 
57 Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 880 
(2005).  See also infra notes 96–103 and accompanying text for expanded discussion of the 
requirements of making a facial challenge to the AWA Amendments. 
58 United States v. Crowell, No. 06-1095, 2006 WL 3541736 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2006). 
59 See United States v. Cossey, 637 F. Supp. 2d 881, 884 (D. Mont. 2009) (describing 
Crowell as “the first district court opinion to conclude the AWA amendments are 
unconstitutional”); United States v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(describing how Crowell was the first to consider the constitutionality of the AWA 
Amendments). 
60 See, e.g., Vujnovich, 2007 WL 4125901, at *2 (“[T]his Court, for the purpose of 
brevity in this opinion, adopts and incorporates herein, in their entirety, the legal conclusions 
reached by the Crowell court.”); United States v. Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1028 (N.D. 
Cal. 2007) (“[T]his Court does not find Crowell dispositive to the case at bar.”). 
61 Crowell, 2006 WL 3541736, at *4. 
62 Id. at *5 (citing to Salerno, 481 U.S. at 754). 
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characteristics, the circumstances of the offense, or consideration of factors 
demonstrating that those same legitimate objectives can be achieved 
through less onerous release conditions “will subject a defendant, for whom 
such conditions are, in the court’s judgment, unnecessary, to excessive bail 
in violation of the Eighth Amendment.”63
Next, the court held that the AWA Amendments violate procedural 
due process under the Fifth Amendment because mandating certain pretrial 
release conditions and eliminating a defendant’s right to an independent 
judicial determination directly restrict judicial discretion, the procedural 
safeguard the Salerno Court cited as saving the BRA from violating 
procedural due process.
 
64  The court in Crowell also held that the AWA 
Amendments violate separation of powers because they “unambiguously 
impose[] upon the federal judiciary a specific rule to be applied in 
determining the release of a defendant charged with specified offenses, 
thereby denying the court . . . its judicial authority to set such conditions.”65
Many other courts have followed Crowell’s lead and similarly held 
that the AWA Amendments are facially unconstitutional.
 
66  In United States 
v. Torres,67 a judge from the Western District of Texas held that the AWA 
Amendments’ mandatory pretrial release conditions violated the Due 
Process Clause because “procedural due process as set out by the United 
States Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge68 and Salerno” demands 
more than mandating that “every arrestee be treated the same,” stripped 
away of any independent judicial evaluation.69  Unlike Crowell, however, 
the court in Torres did not find that the AWA Amendments violated the 
Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Bail Clause on its face because “there are 
circumstances when a court could reasonably find that the Adam Walsh 
Amendments are valid under the Eighth Amendment.”70
 
63 Id. at *7. 
 
64 Id. at *9 (citing to Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751). 
65 Id. at 11 (citing to Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 
(1986)). 
66 See supra note 56.   
67 566 F. Supp. 2d 591, 595 (W.D. Tex. 2008). 
68 424 U.S. 319 (1976).  See infra note 122 and accompanying text for full discussion of 
Mathews v. Eldridge and its procedural due process analysis.  
69 Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 596. 
70 Id. at 600.  Like in Torres, in United States v. Arzberger the district judge in the 
Southern District of New York also held that the AWA Amendments facially violated the 
Due Process Clause but did not facially violate the Excessive Bail Clause.  See 592 F. Supp. 
2d at 604; see also United States v. Smedley, 611 F. Supp. 2d 971, 975–77 (E.D. Mo. 2009) 
(holding that the AWA Amendments were facially unconstitutional under the Due Process 
Clause but not resolving whether they were unconstitutional under the Excessive Bail Clause 
or separation of powers grounds). 
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B. UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED 
Some courts have declined to rule on whether the AWA Amendments 
are facially unconstitutional, preferring to rule narrowly on an as-applied 
basis.  In United States v. Vujnovich, the magistrate judge granted the 
defendant’s motion to remove the pretrial condition of electronic 
monitoring imposed by the AWA Amendments, and “adopt[ed] and 
incorporate[d] . . . the legal conclusions reached by the Crowell court” in 
holding that the Amendment was unconstitutional.71  On appeal, the district 
judge declined to decide the AWA Amendments’ facial constitutionality 
and instead held that the mandatory imposition of electronic monitoring 
based solely on the crimes charged violated procedural due process as 
applied to the defendant in the case.72
Similarly, a judge in the Western District of Washington in United 
States v. Kennedy found that the AWA Amendments “under facts of this 
case” were unconstitutional as a violation of the Excessive Bail Clause and 
Due Process Clause.
 
73  In Kennedy, like most other cases where the 
constitutionality of the Amendments was raised, the Government sought to 
have the court modify the conditions of the defendant’s release.74  Although 
the court adopted the reasoning of the court in Crowell, which held that the 
AWA Amendments were facially unconstitutional, it instead found that the 
AWA Amendments were unconstitutional “as applied to the Defendant.”75  
Moreover, the court did not even address the requirements of a facial 
challenge.  As discussed below, the Ninth Circuit ultimately reversed the 
court’s decision.76
In addition, in United States v. Polouizzi, United States District Judge 
Jack Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York found that AWA’s 
requirement of electronic monitoring was “unconstitutional as applied in the 
present case” because it “violates the constitutional prohibition on excessive 





71 No. 07-20126, 2007 WL 4125901, at *2 (D. Kan. Nov. 20, 2007). 
  Judge Weinstein declined to decide whether the Adam 
72 United State v. Vujnovich, No. 07-20126, 2008 WL 687203, at *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 11, 
2008). 
73 593 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1227 (W.D. Wash. 2008), rev’d, 327 F. App’x 706 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
74 Id. at 1223.  In Kennedy, the Government sought to add the following conditions 
pursuant to the Adam Walsh Act Amendments: (1) electronic monitoring; (2) restrictions on 
place of abode; and (3) a specified curfew.  Id.  
75 Id. at 1233 (emphasis added). 
76 See infra notes 88–90 and accompanying text for a discussion of United States v. 
Kennedy, 327 F. App’x 706 (9th Cir. 2009).   
77 697 F. Supp. 2d 381, 395 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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Walsh Act was facially constitutional, but suggested that it was because 
“[t]here will be situations where certain sex offenders require that Adam 
Walsh’s most stringent conditions be imposed.”78
The Eighth Circuit, one of two appellate courts to address the 
constitutionality of the AWA Amendments to the BRA, overturned a 
decision from the Northern District of Iowa that held the AWA’s imposition 
of mandatory pretrial release conditions unconstitutional because the 
defendant could not “establish there are no child pornography defendants 
for whom a curfew or electronic monitoring is appropriate.”
 
79  Like the 
other courts, the Eighth Circuit did not believe that Salerno’s “no 
circumstances” for facial unconstitutionality was satisfied.80
C. CONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED 
 
Only a few courts have found that the AWA Amendments are 
constitutional as applied.  In United States v. Gardner, a judge in the 
Northern District of California upheld the constitutionality of the AWA 
Amendments as applied to the defendant, rejecting his argument that the 
Amendments violated the Excessive Bail Clause, the Due Process Clause, 
and separation of powers.81
First, the court held that imposing electronic monitoring pursuant to 
the Amendments was not a violation of the Excessive Bail Clause as 
applied to the defendant because the conditions legislatively imposed were 
not excessive in relation to the government’s interest in “ensuring that 
children have additional protection from sexual attacks and other violent 
crimes” and “obtaining an additional safeguard against the risk of post-
arrest criminal activity.”
 
82  The court reasoned that electronic monitoring is 
“slightly more intrusive” than the conditions the judicial officer found 
necessary—curfew and travel restrictions.83  But, the court concluded 
electronic monitoring did not “change the substantive restrictions on [the 
defendant’s] liberty—she is to comply with the curfew irrespective of how 
it is monitored.”84
 
78 Id.; see also A.G. Sulzberger, Defiant Judge Takes On Child Pornography Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 21, 2010, at A1 (describing Judge Weinstein’s rulings in the Polouizzi case). 
 
79 United States v. Stephens, 594 F.3d 1033, 1038 (8th Cir. 2010), rev’g 699 F. Supp. 
960 (N.D. Iowa 2009). 
80 Id. 
81 523 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
82 Id. at 1029, 1031 (internal quote omitted). 
83 Id. at 1030. 
84 Id.  The court in Gardner also addressed and rejected the defendant’s argument that 
the AWA Amendments violate the separation of powers, explaining that “[t]here is no final 
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The court also addressed the defendant’s procedural due process 
argument, admitting that while the lack of any opportunity to be heard on 
the enumerated conditions imposed by the AWA Amendments raises a 
closer question under the Due Process Clause than under the Excessive Bail 
Clause,85 a Due Process Clause challenge as applied to the current facts 
could not be sustained.86  The court reasoned that “even assuming arguendo 
that some conditions of release would impair liberty interests cognizable 
under the Fifth Amendment, here what is at issue is the singular condition 
of electronic monitoring to enforce an already imposed curfew,” an 
“incremental restriction” that alone does not implicate a protected liberty 
interest within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.87
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit in an unpublished memorandum decision 
in United States v. Kennedy
 
88 held that the AWA Amendments were 
constitutional because they could be construed as “requir[ing] the district 
court to exercise its discretion, to the extent practicable, in applying the 
mandatory release conditions.”89  Thus, in applying the pretrial release 
conditions mandatorily imposed by the AWA Amendments to individuals 
charged with sexual offenses against children, the court “consider[ed] all 
relevant factors, including the defendant’s job related needs,” and explained 
how a lower court could set a procedure by “which defendant may travel by 
air for work, with prior notice and approval.”90  Similarly, in United States 
v. Cossey,91 a judge in the District of Montana upheld the AWA 
Amendments’ constitutionality because they could be construed “as 
allowing a judicial officer broad discretion to fashion conditions of pretrial 
release on an individualized basis within the framework the AWA 
amendments provide.”92
 
judgment in [the defendant’s] case” and that the “[b]ail process is not part of the adjudication 
of the merits of the case but an ancillary proceeding.”  Id. at 1035. 
  Both the Ninth Circuit in Kennedy and the District 
of Montana in Cossey justified their unique approach to applying the AWA 
Amendments by citing to the principle of statutory construction that a 
85 Id. at 1032 (“While the Court is troubled by automaticity of the Adam Walsh Act in 
imposing certain release conditions without a judicial determination, the facts of the instant 
case do not support [the defendant’s] procedural due process claim.”). 
86 Id. at 1031. 
87 Id. at 1032. 
88 327 F. App’x 706 (9th Cir. 2009). 
89 Id. at 707. 
90 Id. at 708. 
91 637 F. Supp. 2d 881 (D. Mont. 2009). 
92 Id. at 891. 
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statute is to be construed, if such a construction is fairly possible, to avoid 
raising doubts of its constitutionality.93
The conflict among the courts regarding the AWA Amendments’ 
constitutionality underscores the pressing need for the issue to be resolved 
either judicially by a Supreme Court decision or congressionally by repeal 
or revision of the Amendments.  Since there are no published circuit court 
opinions on this issue, let alone a circuit split, Supreme Court review is 
extremely unlikely any time soon.
 
94
IV. CONGRESS MUST REPEAL OR REVISE THE ADAM WALSH ACT 
AMENDMENTS TO THE BRA 
  Accordingly, Part IV argues that 
Congress should repeal or revise the AWA Amendments to the BRA, and 
Part V proposes revisions to the Amendments. 
First and foremost, the AWA Amendments are facially 
unconstitutional as a violation of the Excessive Bail and Due Process 
Clauses.95
A. THE ADAM WALSH AMENDMENTS TO THE BAIL REFORM ACT ARE 
FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
  As discussed in Part III, many district courts have taken this 
position.  In addition to the AWA Amendments’ unconstitutionality, this 
Comment also argues that the Amendments mandatory imposition of 
pretrial release conditions on certain enumerated defendants is inconsistent 
with the BRA’s well-established regulatory scheme of federal pretrial 
release and detention, and yields little additional benefit to public safety at a 
high cost to defendants. 
A threshold question in any case challenging the constitutionality of 
legislation is whether the attack is directed to the validity of the statute on 
its face or only as applied to the particular circumstances of the litigant 
 
93 Id. at 888 (citing Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 239 (1999)); see also Kennedy, 
327 F. App’x at 707 (“In light of the government’s concessions and in view of the 
established principle that a statute should be read to avoid serious constitutional issues, we 
construe the Walsh Act to require the district court to exercise its discretion, to the extent 
practicable, in applying the mandatory release conditions.”).   
94 See SUP. CT. R. 10 (“Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of 
judicial discretion.  A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling 
reasons,” which include “a United States court of appeals [entering] a decision in conflict 
with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same important matter.”). 
95 This Comment agrees with Judge Francis’s opinion in Arzberger that the AWA 
Amendments do not violate separation of powers because “the Supreme Court has already 
determined that Congress may impinge on the traditionally judicial function of bail setting 
by declaring that defendants who meet certain criteria will not be entitled to bail at all” and 
“the role of the judiciary in setting bail conditions, while primary, is not exclusive.”  United 
States v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
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bringing the challenge.96  If a court holds a statute unconstitutional on its 
face, the state may not enforce it under any circumstances, unless an 
appropriate court narrows its application.97  When a court holds a statute 
unconstitutional as applied to particular facts, however, the state may 
enforce the statute in circumstances involving different facts.98
The Supreme Court generally disfavors facial challenges.
 
99  In 
Salerno, the Court explained that “[a] facial challenge to a legislative Act is, 
of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the 
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which 
the Act would be valid.”100  On the other hand, in Chicago v. Morales the 
Court suggested that Salerno’s “test” was merely dicta and had never been a 
decisive factor in any Supreme Court case.101  Other recent cases also 
suggest that the Salerno rule is in retreat.102  Despite these developments, as 
one commentator has pointed out, “Salerno still hangs on as official 
doctrine” because “[a]s of yet, a majority of the Court has not repudiated or 
explicitly limited Salerno” and “[l]ower courts continue to apply 
Salerno.”103
1. The Adam Walsh Act Amendments are Facially Unconstitutional Under 
the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Bail Clause 
  Accordingly, this Comment assumes Salerno controls a facial 
challenge analysis. 
The imposition of mandatory pretrial release conditions is 
unconstitutional as a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Bail 
Clause.  The Eighth Amendment addresses pretrial release by providing that 
“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required.”104  Although the text of the Eighth 
Amendment appears to address the amount of bail fixed (i.e. a monetary 
constraint), courts agree that it controls pretrial release.105
 
96 Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 
235, 236. (1994). 
  As noted by the 
court in United States v. Gardner, “[i]f this most extreme condition—
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 See id. 
100 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).  
101 527 U.S. 41, 55 n.22 (1999). 
102 See David H. Gans, Strategic Facial Challenges, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1333, 1336 n.16 
(2005) (“The Salerno rule, of late, is in retreat.  In a number of recent cases, the Court has 
disregarded the Salerno rule and invalidated challenged statutes under a different, more 
lenient rule, without as much as a nod towards Salerno.”). 
103 See id. 
104 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
105 United States v. Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1029 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
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detention—is amenable to scrutiny under the Excessive Bail Clause of the 
Eighth Amendment, it would seem that conditions of release, particularly 
those that approach confinement in function (e.g., home detention enforced 
by electronic monitoring), should be subject to scrutiny as well.”106  
Moreover, in Salerno, the Supreme Court explained that “[t]he only 
arguable substantive limitation of the Bail Clause is that the Government’s 
proposed conditions of release or detention not be ‘excessive’ in light of the 
perceived evil,” a clear indication that the Excessive Bail Clause governs 
pretrial release.107
Salerno also suggests that the Excessive Bail Clause requires a judicial 
officer to exercise his discretion in setting pretrial release conditions.
 
108  
The Court in Salerno explained that the Excessive Bail Clause requires that 
“the Government’s proposed conditions of release or detention not be 
‘excessive’ in light of the perceived evil.”109  According to the Court, “to 
determine whether the Government’s response is excessive, we must 
compare that response against the interest the Government seeks to protect 
by means of that response.”110  Thus, the Court concluded that “when the 
Government has admitted that its only interest is in preventing flight, bail 
must be set by a court at a sum designed to ensure that goal, and no 
more.”111  Therefore, the BRA’s pretrial detention provision was not 
facially excessive because it fell within a “carefully limited exception” of 
“arrestees charged with serious felonies who are found after an adversary 
hearing to pose a threat to the safety of individuals or to the community 
which no condition of release can dispel.”112
Accordingly, under Salerno we must compare the government’s 
general interest in protecting the public with its “response” to that interest—
the AWA Amendments’ mandatory imposition on the defendant accused 
with sexual offenses against children of the following pretrial release 
conditions: (1) refraining from contact with minors absent the direct 
supervision of a responsible adult; (2) refraining from contact with the 




107 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987) (emphasis added). 
108 Id. at 751–53; see also Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) (holding that “the fixing 
of bail for any individual defendant must be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of 
assuring the presence of that defendant,” and that “[b]ail set at a figure higher than an 
amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is ‘excessive’ under the Eighth 
Amendment.”). 
109 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 754 (emphasis added). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 754 (citing Stack, 342 U.S. at 5). 
112 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755. 
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(3) participating in a home confinement program and abiding by all 
requirements of the program, including electronic monitoring or other 
location verification system, the cost of which each defendant will be 
required to pay, either in whole or in part; and (4) submitting to a curfew 
restricting each defendant to his residence.113
Even assuming arguendo that the pretrial release conditions advance 
the public’s valid interest in protecting children from sexual abuse and 
exploitation, the Amendments still subject a defendant to excessive bail in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment.  Imposition of the AWA Amendments’ 
mandatory pretrial release conditions on all defendants charged with certain 
crimes, regardless of personal characteristics, circumstances of the offense, 
or consideration of factors demonstrating that those same legitimate 
objectives cannot be achieved with less onerous release conditions, will 




Moreover, Congress did not articulate any interest in making these 
pretrial conditions mandatory.  As discussed above, the AWA Amendments 
to the BRA were added to the language of the AWA only seven days prior 
to the bill’s final passage, without substantive debate or supporting 
congressional reports.
 
115  Unlike the AWA’s other provisions,116 there are 
no legislative findings explaining Congress’s interest in having mandatory 
pretrial release conditions.117  In fact, some of the courts that have rejected 
the Excessive Bail Clause argument for holding the AWA Amendments 
unconstitutional have found that the general interest of “protecting the 
safety of children” is sufficient to justify the AWA Amendments’ pretrial 
release conditions, but have not separately considered whether the interest 
justifies the fact that they are mandatorily imposed.118
 
113 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (2006). 
  Whereas the AWA 
Amendments’ general interest in protecting children from sex offenders 
114 United States v. Crowell, No. 06-1095, 2006 WL 3541736, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 
2006). 
115 See 152 CONG. REC. S8012 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (debate following passage of 
Sen. Hatch’s amendment in the nature of a substitute that included the mandatory 
conditions). 
116 See supra note 48.   
117 Id. 
118 See, e.g., United States v. Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d 591, 600 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (“[The 
defendant] is correct insofar as he points out that Congress did not engage in substantive 
debate nor develop supporting congressional reports with regard to the Adam Walsh 
Amendments at issue here.  However, there are legislative findings pertaining to the Adam 
Walsh Act itself.  The Act states that the Government’s interest in the legislation is to 
provide additional protection to children ‘from sexual attacks and other violent crimes.’”) 
(citation omitted). 
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might suffice if the conditions were based on individual circumstances, it is 
insufficient in light of the much greater burden mandatory pretrial release 
conditions impose on defendants. 
Some have argued that the AWA Amendments cannot be facially 
unconstitutional under the Excessive Bail Clause because they fail to meet 
Salerno’s “no circumstances” standard for facially unconstitutional 
legislation,119 since there are in fact some circumstances when a court 
would determine that these conditions of release are not excessive in light 
of the perceived evil an individual poses based on his individual 
circumstances and characteristics.120
2. The Adam Walsh Act Amendments are Facially Invalid Under the Due 
Process Clause 
  Yet, even if the “some circumstances” 
requirement for a facial challenge forces courts to rule on the AWA 
Amendments’ constitutionality on an “as applied” basis, this will essentially 
render the mandatory requirement moot anyway.  The AWA Amendments 
will be toothless when a judge determines after an individualized hearing 
that the mandatory conditions imposed on the defendant are excessive and, 
therefore, unconstitutional as applied. 
The AWA Amendments to the Bail Reform Act of 1984 are also 
facially unconstitutional as a violation of procedural due process under the 
Fifth Amendment, which provides that “No person shall . . . be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”121  Under Mathews v. 
Eldridge, procedural due process requires consideration of three distinct 
factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
(2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, including the 
function involved, and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.122
Each of the AWA Amendments’ mandatory pretrial release conditions 
infringe upon a significant private interest.  Electronic monitoring, 
 
 
119 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (“A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the 
most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set 
of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.”).  See also supra notes 96–103 
and accompanying text for discussion on facial challenge requirements. 
120 See, e.g., United States v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(rejecting Excessive Bail Clause facial challenge to the AWA Amendments because there 
are circumstances when a court could reasonably find the Amendments valid); Torres, 566 
F. Supp. 2d at 600 (same). 
121 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
122 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976). 
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mandatory curfew, and restrictions on personal associations, place of abode, 
or travel deprive an individual of his right of “freedom of movement among 
locations” and the right “to remain in a public place,” which are 
fundamental to our sense of personal liberty “protected by the 
Constitution.”123
The AWA Amendments’ mandatory condition that a defendant 
charged with one or more of the enumerated offenses avoid all contact with 
a potential witness who may testify implicates the First Amendment right of 
association.  The Supreme Court in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. 
declared that “one of the foundations of our society is the right of 
individuals to combine with other persons in pursuit of a common goal by 
lawful means.”
 
124  The Supreme Court has held that to be cognizable, the 
interference with associational rights must be “direct and substantial” or 
“significant.”125  The AWA Amendments surely meet this requirement, as a 
person accused of certain crimes is categorically prohibited from any 
contact with a class of individuals.126
Also, the AWA Amendments’ mandatory requirement that an 
individual refrain from possessing a firearm, destructive device, or other 
dangerous weapon infringes on an individual’s Second Amendment right to 
bear arms as established in District of Columbia v. Heller.
 
127  Although the 
Court in Heller indicated that this privilege may be withdrawn from some 
groups of persons such as convicted felons, there is no basis for 
categorically depriving persons who are merely accused of certain crimes of 
the right to legal possession of a firearm.128
The AWA Amendments’ mandatory pretrial release conditions pose a 
high risk of erroneously depriving individuals of their private interests
 
129 
because there is no individualized judicial determination of whether their 
imposition is necessary to ensure the public’s safety based upon the 
arrestee’s particular circumstances. 130
 
123 Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 597 (citing 
  Consequently, “there is no means of 
Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900)). 
124 458 U.S. 886, 933 (1982). 
125 Lyng v. Int’l Union, 485 U.S. 360, 366, 367 & n.5 (1988) (citation omitted). 
126 United States v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590, 603–04 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
127 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
128 Id. at 2816–17. 
129 See Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 603–04 (“[T]here is no indication of what the 
overall ‘error rate’ might be with respect to defendants generally, that is, how many 
defendants upon whom the Amendments automatically impose a curfew would be relieved 
of that condition if their specific circumstances were considered.  But especially in the 
absence of any findings by Congress as to the efficacy of a curfew requirement, it cannot be 
assumed that courts would generally require a curfew for defendants charged with child 
pornography offenses if such a condition were discretionary rather than mandatory.”). 
130 United States v. Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d 591, 598 (W.D. Tex. 2008). 
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knowing whether the deprivation is erroneous or warranted.”131  Imposing 
certain pretrial conditions based merely on an arrestee’s status as one 
allegedly involved in a certain crime will lead to situations where the 
defendant is burdened with conditions that a judge would have found 
unnecessary and inappropriate.132
Procedural safeguards in imposing the AWA Amendments’ pretrial 
release conditions would alleviate the risk of erroneous deprivation because 
a judicial officer would be able to ensure that conditions are appropriate in 
light of the arrestee’s individual circumstances.  In fact, the Supreme Court 
in Salerno found that the BRA’s procedural safeguards under § 3142(f),
 
133 
including judicial evaluation of an individual’s circumstances at a hearing, 
“further[ed] the accuracy” of the determination of defendant’s future 
dangerousness, and, ultimately, whether pretrial detention or conditional 
pretrial release was appropriate.134
Lastly, affording a defendant the procedural protections provided to 
him under the BRA—namely, the opportunity to present evidence at a bail 
hearing as to his individual characteristics and the particular circumstances 
of his offense—would not impede or burden the government’s interest in 
applying the pretrial conditions prescribed by the AWA Amendments.
  Likewise, limiting the imposition of the 
AWA Amendments’ pretrial conditions to situations where they are found 
to be appropriate after a § 3142(f) hearing would similarly “further the 
accuracy” of the defendant’s pretrial release order. 
135  
For one, the Amendments’ pretrial conditions could still be imposed, but 
only when a judicial officer deems them appropriate.  Also, the additional 
procedural protections would reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation at 
little cost; proceedings are already conducted to determine whether a 
defendant should be detained or released on bail, the amount of bail, and the 
need for conditions of release other than those required by the AWA 
Amendments.136
The Court’s discussion of procedural due process in Salerno further 
supports the AWA Amendments’ facial unconstitutionality.  Unlike the 
  Accordingly, the additional burden of requiring a judicial 
officer to make an individualized determination as to whether the AWA 
Amendments’ now mandatory pretrial conditions are necessary to ensure 




133 Section 3142(f) also provides a defendant with the right to counsel, the ability to 
testify on one’s own behalf, the ability to present information by proffer or otherwise, and 
the right to cross-examine witnesses who appear at the hearing. 
134 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987). 
135 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (2006). 
136 § 3142(f). 
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facial test for the Excessive Bail Clause, which looks at the substantive 
consequence of the Amendments, whether bail will be excessive in light of 
the perceived evil,137 in Salerno the Court explained it would sustain a 
facial challenge to BRA’s detention provision if the procedures were 
“adequate to authorize the pretrial detention of at least some [persons] 
charged with crimes whether or not they may be insufficient in some 
particular circumstances.”138  The Court held that the BRA’s “extensive 
safeguards suffice to repel a facial challenge” because the procedures by 
which a judicial officer evaluates the likelihood of future dangerousness are 
specifically designed to further the accuracy of the future dangerousness 
determination.139
There are absolutely no procedural safeguards when applying the 
AWA Amendments’ pretrial release conditions to individuals charged with 
the applicable offenses.  In fact, the raison d’ être of mandatory pretrial 
release conditions is to ensure that they are imposed when a judge would 
otherwise think they are unnecessary based on the individual defendant’s 
circumstances.  Some might argue that the Court’s procedural due process 
analysis in Salerno does not control the AWA Amendments because the 
pretrial release conditions at issue are inapposite to detention without bail.  
While it is true that a defendant has significantly more at stake in the 
context of detention than conditions limiting an individual’s pretrial release 
liberty, there is no hierarchy of constitutional rights.
 
140
Some might also argue that the Amendments are not facially violative 
of the Due Process Clause because there will be some situations where the 





137 See supra notes 
  Yet, while this argument has some merit in the context 
of the Excessive Bail Clause, it fails in the context of due process because 
Mathews v. Eldridge requires that the procedures themselves be adequate. 
104–120 and accompanying text for discussion of facial challenge to 
Excessive Bail Clause.  
138 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987) (quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 
U.S. 253, 264 (1984)). 
139 Id. at 752. 
140 See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008) (“The very 
enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of government—even the Third Branch of 
Government—the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth 
insisting upon.”). 
141 See, e.g., United States v. Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1032–33 (N.D. Cal. 2007) 
(arguing that the imposition of electronic monitoring does not violate procedural due process 
in part because it “represents only a minor change in [the defendant’s] current regimen of 
release conditions”). 
302 MICHAEL R. HANDLER [Vol. 101 
3. Is There an Alternative Construction of the Adam Walsh Act Amendments 
to Avoid Constitutional Doubt? 
Under the constitutional avoidance doctrine of statutory interpretation, 
judges construe a statute to avoid raising doubts of its constitutionality.142  
Conceding that the dictates of the Due Process and Excessive Bail Clauses 
require an individualized assessment in determining appropriate pretrial 
release conditions, some courts contend that the AWA Amendments can be 
interpreted consistently with this requirement so long as judicial officers 
apply the mandatory pretrial release conditions based on their 
individualized determination of all relevant factors, including job-related 
needs.143  For example, all defendants charged under the AWA 
Amendments are subject to a curfew, but one defendant may have a later 
curfew than another because he gets off of work at a later time.144
While it is true that the AWA Amendments “confer[] upon the [district 
judge] a great deal of discretion with respect to the implementation of the 
[release] conditions that are required by the [AWA Amendments],”
 
145 the 
dictates of procedural due process as set out in Mathews v. Eldridge require 
individualized determination of appropriate conditions, not just the scope of 
the condition.  Even assuming that a judge frames the conditions in a 
manner most favorable to the defendant, their imposition still impedes his 
significant interest in liberty.  This argument is bolstered by the fact that 
neither of the two decisions to take the “constitutional avoidance” approach 
described in Parts III and IV146—Cossey and Kennedy—applied the 
Mathews procedural due process test.147
 
142 See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 
 
50, at 361; see also Ashwanter v. Tenn. Valley 
Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“When the validity of an act of 
the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it 
is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute 
is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”).   
143 See cases cited supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text.   
144 See, e.g., United States v. Cossey, 637 F. Supp. 2d 881, 890–91 (D. Mont. 2009) 
(describing how AWA Amendments were not imposed as a “blanket prescription” because 
the magistrate “fashion[ed] an appropriate condition of electronic monitoring that would 
enable [the defendant] to continue his employment”). 
145 United States v. Kennedy, 327 F. App’x 706, 707 (9th Cir. 2009). 
146 See supra notes 88-93 and Part IV.A.3.   
147 See United States v. Stephens, No. 09-3037, 2009 WL 3823964, at *9 n.2 (N.D. Iowa 
2009) (holding that the AWA Amendments constituted facial violation of due process and 
rejecting the reasoning and decision in United States v. Cossey, 637 F. Supp. 2d 881 (D. 
Mont. 2009) and United States v. Kennedy, 327 F. App’x 706, 707 (9th Cir. 2009) because 
“neither contain any Mathews analysis”).   
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B. THE ADAM WALSH ACT AMENDMENTS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH 
THE BRA’S INDIVIDUALIZED BAIL FRAMEWORK 
Although the AWA Amendments’ unconstitutionality is as good of a 
reason as any for their repeal or revision, and the district courts have 
primarily justified their refusal to apply the Amendments’ mandatory 
imposition of pretrial release conditions on constitutional grounds, there is 
also a normative legal justification.  The AWA Amendments’ imposition of 
mandatory pretrial release conditions is inconsistent with the central 
principle of the BRA’s regulatory scheme—individualized bail based on a 
judicial determination. 
When Congress enacted the BRA, one of its goals was to “provid[e] 
for flexibility in setting conditions of release appropriate to the 
characteristics of individual defendants.”148
[m]any of the changes in the bail reform act [of 1984] . . . reflect the committee’s 
determination that federal bail law must address the alarming problem of crimes 
committed by persons on release and must give the courts adequate authority to make 
release decisions that give appropriate recognition to the danger a person may pose to 
others if released.
  Congress further observed that  
149
One possible argument is that the whole act rule of statutory 
interpretation mandates that judges interpret the Amendments so that they 
are consistent with the BRA’s procedural scheme of individualized bail 
based on judicial hearing.  Under the whole act rule, a statute is interpreted 
with the presumption in mind that “Congress uses terms consistently, 
intends that each provision add something to the statutory scheme, and does 




Here, however, there is no ambiguity in the text of the AWA 
Amendments from which one can reasonably construe them so that, 
consistent with the BRA’s regulatory scheme, the conditions of pretrial 





148 S. REP. NO. 225-98, at 26 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3187–88 
(1984). 
  All courts that have issued reported decisions addressing 
149 Id. 
150 ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 51, at 271. 
151 The whole act rule is a canon of statutory construction that is used to interpret 
ambiguous statutes.  See United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs, 
Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (describing statutory construction as a “holistic endeavor” 
and noting that “[a] provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the 
remainder of the statutory scheme—because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a 
context that makes its meaning clear, or because only one of the permissible meanings 
produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law”) (citation omitted). 
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the AWA Amendments’ constitutionality agree with the court in Crowell 
that “[t]he plain language of the Adam Walsh Amendments establishes that 
Congress has attempted to mandate the imposition by the court of certain 
pretrial release conditions for those defendants charged with certain 
crimes.”152
Instead of judicial application of the whole act rule, Congress should 
aspire to the doctrine’s normative goal of a consistent statutory scheme 
because “[a] polity whose law knits together into a seamless fabric is one 
whose law enjoys greater authority than a polity whose statutory law 
appears largely random.”
  Thus, considering that congressional intent is clear based on the 
text of the AWA Amendments, anything but interpreting the statute to 
mandate that the court impose the pretrial release conditions prescribed by 
the Amendments would be the equivalent of the judiciary rewriting the 
statute. 
153  As Ronald Dworkin explains in Law’s Empire, 
“[i]nternally compromised statutes cannot be seen as flowing from any 
single coherent scheme of principle; on the contrary, they serve the 
incompatible aim of a rulebook community, which is to compromise 
convictions along lines of power.”154
C. THE ADAM WALSH ACT AMENDMENTS ARE CHARACTERIZED BY 
HIGH COSTS AND LOW BENEFITS 
  Therefore, Congress should revise the 
Amendments so that, consistent with the rest of the BRA’s principled 
approach to bail, the prescribed pretrial conditions are imposed only if 
found appropriate to the individual’s circumstances after a judicial hearing. 
The AWA Amendments’ mandatory pretrial release conditions are not 
only unconstitutional and inconsistent with the BRA’s regulatory scheme of 
judicially determined bail, but also come at a great cost to defendants while 
yielding marginal additional safety to the public.  Since there were no 
legislative findings behind Congress’s adding and passing the Amendments 
to the BRA as part of the Adam Walsh Act, we can only speculate as to 
why Congress thought mandatory pretrial release conditions were 
necessary.155
It is clear that electronic monitoring and the other conditions in the 
BRA that are made mandatory by the Amendments are intended to protect 
the public from the defendant.  Yet, as courts have pointed out, 
“[p]roceedings are already conducted to determine whether a defendant 
 
 
152 United States v. Crowell, No. 06-1095, 2006 WL 3541736, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 
2006). 
153 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 214 (1986).   
154 Id.  
155 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
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should be detained or released on bail, the amount of bail, and the need for 
conditions of release other than those required by the Amendment . . . .”156
Even assuming that Congress is justifiably concerned that judicial 
officers apply overly lenient pretrial release conditions, there are other 
procedural prophylactic measures in place to ensure pretrial release 
conditions are appropriate.  For example, either party may directly appeal a 
trial court’s release order.
  
Thus, by making the pretrial release conditions mandatory, Congress is in 
effect second-guessing the judicial officer’s judgment.  Separation of 
powers aside, this is troubling because Congress is doing so via a blanket 
rule that bases pretrial release conditions exclusively on the offense the 
defendant is charged with and, unlike the rest of the BRA’s regulatory bail 
scheme, does not take into consideration the individual’s circumstances. 
157  Considering that district court judges usually 
decide bail on appeal after a magistrate judge has issued a pretrial release 
order, a prosecutor fearful that pretrial release conditions are not strict 
enough has two opportunities to appeal.158
A blanket rule imposing pretrial release conditions on defendants 
without regard to their individual characteristics and circumstances, and the 
inevitable unnecessary constraints placed on defendants that naturally 
follow from such a rule, is especially offensive when one considers how 
costly implementing these conditions is to the defendants themselves and to 
the government.  As discussed above, all of the AWA Amendments’ 




For example, the defendant must pay for electronic monitoring out of 
his own pocket unless he cannot afford it.
  Furthermore, the defendant does not always bear the 
cost of following the AWA Amendments’ mandatory pretrial release 
conditions by himself. 
160  At around thirty dollars per 
week,161
 
156 United States v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see also 
United States v. Smedley, 611 F. Supp. 2d 971, 974 (E.D. Mo. 2009). 
 the cost of electronic monitoring can accumulate quickly, 
considering that many defendants wait months or even years for a trial.  
Usually, someone in addition to the defendant, such as a spouse, children, 
157 See Samuel Wiseman, Discrimination, Coercion, and the Bail Reform Act of 1984: 
The Loss of the Core Constitutional Protections of the Excessive Bail Clause, 36 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 121, 144 (2009) (“Appeal from pretrial detention is available, although the 
standard of review varies widely among the circuit courts of appeal.”). 
158 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2006). 
159 See supra Part IV.A.2. 
160 Telephone Interview with Anne Marie Carey, Chief of Pretrial Servs., N. Dist. of Ill. 
(Mar. 12, 2010). 
161 Id. 
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or parents, will help pay for electronic monitoring.162  When the defendant 
is indigent, taxpayers foot the bill for electronic monitoring.163
V. A PROPOSED CHANGE TO THE ADAM WALSH ACT AMENDMENTS 
  Although it 
might be a cost they would be happy to pay for if it provides additional 
safety to children, indiscriminately applying costly conditions based on the 
arrestee’s charge rather than individual circumstances will likely lead to 
situations where they pay for electronic monitoring with no net safety 
benefit. 
This Comment has criticized the AWA Amendments as (1) 
unconstitutional, (2) inconsistent with the core principle of the BRA 
regulatory scheme, and (3) characterized by high costs and low benefits.  In 
light of these problems, Congress must take swift action to fix the flaws in 
the AWA Amendments.  Obviously, it could repeal the Amendments.  
However, Congress will likely disfavor such a steep measure, as there is no 
sign that the “passion” which served as impetus for the AWA and the AWA 
Amendments has subsided since 2006.164
As an alternative, Congress could replace the Amendments’ mandatory 
language with a “rebuttable presumption”
 
165 that the now mandatory 
pretrial release conditions will be applied unless a defendant can offer 
contrary evidence that they are not necessary.166
 
162 Id. 
  The rebuttable 
presumption provision is the best of both worlds.  On one hand, it furthers 
the AWA Amendments’ purpose of protecting minors from alleged sex 
offenders.  By shifting the burden of production from the Government to 
the defendant during the BRA’s adversary hearing, public safety is still 
maximized because only defendants that can convincingly show a judge 
that the Amendments’ pretrial release conditions are unnecessary will be 
free from their imposition.  The rebuttable presumption is also consistent 
with the adversary hearing provided by the BRA, as a defendant will have a 
chance to show a judge why the AWA Amendments’ pretrial release 
conditions are not necessary for his situation. 
163 Id. 
164 See Spencer Magloff, Obama Talks Law Enforcement on “America’s Most Wanted,” 
POLITICAL HOTSHEET—CBS NEWS.COM (March 4, 2010, 06:26 EST), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-6267165-503544.html (describing how the 
President during his March 2010 appearance on the television show America’s Most Wanted 
pledged to fully support the Adam Walsh Act). 
165 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1224 (8th ed. 2004).  A “rebuttable presumption” is “[a]n 
inference drawn from certain facts that establish a prima facie case which may be overcome 
by the introduction of contrary evidence.”  Id.  
166 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(2) (2006). 
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Furthermore, there is already a similar provision in the BRA under 
§ 3142(e), in which a rebuttable presumption arises that a defendant should 
be detained if he has been convicted of certain offenses.167  This provision 
was included in the original version of the BRA enacted in 1984, which was 
upheld as constitutional in Salerno.168
While the rebuttable presumption change would resolve the Due 
Process and Excessive Bail Clauses’ constitutional problems that arise due 
to the Amendments’ automaticity, some commentators have suggested that 
the BRA’s rebuttable presumption provision is itself unconstitutional as a 
violation of due process.
  In short, revising the Amendments 
so that a judge has some discretion and a defendant has an opportunity to 
explain why these pretrial release conditions are not necessary to ensure 
public safety protects the defendant’s constitutional rights while ensuring 
that the government is able to regulate bail in a manner that maximizes 
public safety. 
169  Even if there is a strong argument in theory 
against the constitutionality of the BRA’s rebuttable presumption provision, 
practically speaking it is unlikely that after more than twenty-five years any 
appellate court, let alone the Supreme Court, would address this issue.  In 
fact, although the Court in Salerno did not address the constitutionality of 
the BRA’s rebuttable presumption, in holding that the BRA was 
constitutional they implicitly approved it.170
 
167 Id.  The section reads: 
  Changing the AWA 
(A) the person has been convicted of a Federal offense that is described in subsection (f)(1) of 
this section, or of a State or local offense that would have been an offense described in 
subsection (f)(1) of this section if a circumstance giving rise to Federal jurisdiction had existed; 
(B) the offense described in subparagraph (A) was committed while the person was on release 
pending trial for a Federal, State, or local offense; and 
(C) a period of not more than five years has elapsed since the date of conviction, or the release of 
the person from imprisonment, for the offense described in subparagraph (A), whichever is later. 
168 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.   
169 See, e.g., Susan M. Marcella, When Preventive Detention is (Still) Unconstitutional: 
The Invalidity of the Presumption in the 1984 Federal Bail Statute, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091 
(1988) (arguing that the BRA’s presumption of dangerousness violates a defendant’s 
constitutional rights to pretrial liberty); Robert S. Natalini, Preventive Detention and 
Presuming Dangerousness Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 225 
(1985) (arguing that preventive detention resulting from a process in which the accused is 
presumed to be dangerous and bears the burden of rebutting that presumption is a 
deprivation of liberty without due process of law). 
170 The Court in Salerno explicitly upheld the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).  
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (“In our society liberty is the norm, and 
detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.  We hold that the 
provisions for pretrial detention in the Bail Reform Act of 1984 fall within that carefully 
limited exception.”).  Thus, even though the rebuttable presumption provision was not 
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Amendments from being mandatorily imposed to being imposed with a 
rebuttable presumption would fix the Amendments’ unconstitutionality and 
costliness, as well as their inconsistency with the rest of the BRA. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Congress must take action and repeal or revise the AWA 
Amendments.  Imposing mandatory pretrial release conditions on all 
defendants charged with sexual offenses against children is not only 
unconstitutional, as many courts have found,171
 
explicitly mentioned as constitutional, the principle of the “greater includes the lesser” 
suggests it was implicitly upheld as such. 
 but also inconsistent with 
the entire regulatory scheme of bail set forth in the BRA, and very costly.  
Rather than automatic imposition of pretrial release conditions, Congress 
should change the language of the AWA Amendments so that, consistent 
with § 3142(e), the defendant can avoid imposition of the AWA 
Amendments’ now mandatory pretrial release conditions if he can 
demonstrate they do not need to be applied to him to ensure the public’s 
safety.  This is not only consistent with the BRA, but clearly constitutional 
and, most importantly, consistent with Congress’ original intent in enacting 
the AWA Amendments—protecting the public from sexual predators. 
171 See cases cited supra note 56. 
